



NARCOTICS AND THE POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES OF SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Author: Ronald Cima

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
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PREFACE

The role of the police and military forces of South and Southeast Asia, not only as agents of drug enforcement but as conspirators in trafficking, is discussed in this study. This brief assessment concentrates on the military and police forces of the countries comprising the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle areas of South and Southeast Asia where opium is cultivated and trafficking is centered. The information used in this study is current as of 1 August 1986.

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SUMMARY

Drug trafficking and abuse, never alien to South and Southeast Asia, have become, within the space of a decade, phenomena so widespread that Asian societies are having to face for the first time the same drug-derived problems that many previously had thought were confined to the West. The seriousness of the situation in primary drug-producing nations such as Thailand, Burma, and Pakistan equals or surpasses that in neighboring nations such as Malaysia and India whose proximity to the producers has traditionally made them markets and transshipment points.

Inevitably, the police and military forces of these countries have responded to the drug environment not only as enforcers of the law, but as accomplices to trafficking. In general, enforcement by the police and military, except for rare instances, has been ineffective and more symbolic than real. Collusion in trafficking has been so widespread as to seriously call into question whether the existing police and military organizations have not been more a hindrance than an aid to the antidrug effort.

Asian governments are currently facing their drug problems with unprecedented vigor. Motivated perhaps as much by international pressure as by the enormity of their own difficulties, they have taken some positive steps, directing increased attention to improving drug enforcement and combatting corruption.

NARCOTICS AND THE POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES OF SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

INTRODUCTION

This study is about narcotics in South and Southeast Asia and its relationship to the police and military forces. The study focuses on opium, specifically opium refined into heroin, and the two regions where production is concentrated--the "Golden Triangle," located in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Burma, and Laos, and the "Golden Crescent," located in South Asia, including Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹ Immediate neighbors such as Malaysia and India are discussed for their peripheral roles as transshipment points and markets. Together, Golden Triangle and Crescent growers may have produced as much as 1,430 metric tons of opium in 1985, and are expected to produce from 1,241 to 1,581 metric tons in 1986.² Refined into heroin, these quantities roughly translate to 143 tons for 1985 and 124-158 tons for 1986.³ The total demand for heroin in the United States is approximately four tons per annum.⁴

Until 1979, most of the world's opium came from the Golden Triangle. A drought that hit the Burmese corner of the Triangle that year, however, was largely responsible for an unprecedented rise in the price of heroin on the world market, and encouraged poppy growers in Afghanistan and Pakistan to expand production. The Golden Triangle then had two successive years of bad crops at the same time that Thailand and Burma intensified their enforcement measures. The resulting drop in production enabled Golden Crescent growers to surpass Golden Triangle figures and assume the primary position in opium production which they have maintained since that time.

It was during the same period that domestic consumption in Asia became more prevalent. Previously, drug abuse in Asia was almost nonexistent, with governments of the region viewing it as an isolated phenomenon confined to the developed nations of the West. The loss to traffickers of the American military personnel market in South Vietnam with the end of the Vietnam War, and the surpluses accumulated once the rains returned to the Golden Triangle, however, led to the local unloading of an unprecedented volume of narcotics. Asian youth became a target and the number of addicts soared. Thailand may have more than half a million heroin addicts, a figure equal to the number in the United States, while the number in Pakistan has gone from almost none in 1980 to 500,000 in 1986.⁵

Until this point, the attitude of Asian governments toward control measures had been ambivalent at best. In Thailand and Burma, narcotics were viewed not as a control problem but as a security matter, since their cultivation and trafficking were so closely tied with insurgents. This, coupled with the belief that the primary beneficiaries of Asian drug control efforts would be the richer nations of the West, insured that control remained a low priority. As the problem of addiction became a local one, governments understood increasingly the need to control narcotics for their own benefit.

The responsibility fell largely to the police and military forces to carry out eradication and crop substitution programs and to enforce anti-trafficking laws. The darker side of drug enforcement, however, is the corruption which

proximity to the drug trade often breeds. Indications are that in carrying out their enforcement missions, the military and police forces of the countries under study have been unable to avoid this pitfall.

PRIMARY PRODUCING NATIONS

Enforcement

THAILAND

The Office of Narcotics Control is the coordinating agency on narcotics matters in Thailand, and the Thai National Police act as the primary narcotics suppression body. Since 1973, Special Police Narcotics Suppression Centers have had units in Chiang Mai in the the North and Haad Yai in the South, with an additional Bangkok Metropolitan Narcotics Unit operating in the capital. The Royal Thai Customs has special units at international embarkation/debarkation points. Provincial Police have been known to assist in investigations, and the Border Patrol Police--organized into four regional commands--have traditionally conducted operations in the north. In addition, the Royal Thai Army is involved in drug control, principally in opium eradication and interdiction.

Before 1981, Thai narcotics policy was one of benign neglect. The insurgent and warlord organizations involved in narcotics (most notably the Shan United Army led by Khun Sa, also known as Chang Chi Fu) were viewed as necessary buffers against Communist insurgents operating in the north, and Bangkok cooperated with them, rather than root them out. A special Thai Army Command called BK04 was created in 1970 to oversee them. As Khun Sa's control of the border narcotics trade and of border territory increased, however, his activities became more difficult to conceal. At the same time, the Prem Tinsulanonda government began to pay closer attention than its predecessors had to narcotics trafficking activities. Prem visited the United States in October 1981, taking with him General Prachuab Suntarangkoon, then deputy premier in charge of narcotics enforcement, for discussions with US drug officials.

The resulting change in Thai policy was signaled by the first of three attacks on Khun Sa's headquarters in February 1982. The immediate spur to decisive action was probably a concentrated attack by Khun Sa's forces on a group of Thai military personnel within Thai territory the preceding October, although the Thai Government also noted new evidence at that time of collaboration between the Burmese Communist Party and Khun Sa.⁶ The February 1982 raid involved Thai Rangers and the Thai Air Force. The Border Patrol Police were not informed. The Thai military were then involved in a number of operations attacking all of the trafficking groups which had enjoyed bases in the area. By 1985, narcotics refining had been pushed into Burma and all but eliminated on Thai territory. However, Thai eradication efforts, carried out by the Army, have been more symbolic than beneficial. In 1984, the Army manually eradicated 175 hectares of opium in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Nan Provinces. A campaign launched by the 3rd Army in December 1985 destroyed an additional 3,000 hectares.⁷

BURMA

Burma's drug policy is fundamentally different from that of Thailand. In Rangoon's view, the insurgents are the primary security problem, to be rooted out through military action. Because the opium trade finances insurgent operations, attacking its structure is a key component of Burmese strategy. Enforcement and anti-insurgency programs are thus closely allied. However, like the Thai, the Burmese Government had moments of official cooperation with traffickers. In 1963, the formation of local militia-type units called Ka Kwe Ye was authorized to counter Shan insurgents. These units, which included forces under the command of Khun Sa himself, were given a free hand to use Government-controlled roads and villages in the Shan states to facilitate their opium trafficking, and operated until the 1970's, when the Government's opium policy changed.⁸ At one point, in order to battle Khun Sa, the Government was rumored to have rehabilitated his rival Lo Hsing Han, who, in return for agreeing to form a militia, was given a free hand to smuggle jade out of Burma.⁹

Burmese strategy focuses upon interdicting narcotics caravans and destroying refineries and base camps. In 1975, the Burmese Government began a series of offensives against the movement of opium by caravans. These raids, called mohein (literally, thunder), strike at the caravans, blocking their traditional routes and destroying refinery sites. Although the first mohein, targeted against bases in the Pan Pi area, was a success, operations for the next 6 years were less productive. Chronic resource problems limited the ability of the Burmese Army to control the trafficking.

In 1981 Thai officials changed their policy and traffickers were no longer able to flee into Thailand. Traffickers were displaced to the Burmese side of the border, and the Government of Burma accelerated its enforcement program. Insurgent/trafficking organizations in the northern Shan states were also targeted, as were the narcotics activities of the Burmese Communist Party during the Burmese Army's annual multibattalion, dry season offensives against the Communists. Through a 1974 agreement with the United States on narcotics control cooperation, Burma received 25 helicopters and 5 transport aircraft.¹⁰ The aircraft contributed significantly to the Army's mobility in the Shan states and enabled Rangoon to strike quickly at the large narcotics caravans which were operating in the Golden Triangle in the mid-1970's. As a result of these operations, traffickers have shifted transport from pack trains to porter columns, which are far more difficult to interdict.

Until 1984, opium crop destruction was conducted manually by both the Burmese Army and by police units in the "safe" and "contested" zones of the Shan states. Since 1964, annual opium eradication exercises, code-named "Operation Hellflower," have employed thousands of military, police, and civilian personnel to manually destroy 5,000-6,000 hectares of opium each year. At the close of 1984, the Burmese, with US assistance, tested aerial eradication using an anti-opium spray which they now employ on a regular basis. The technique has proven to be far more effective than the manual method, as a reported 9,823 hectares of poppies were destroyed during the early part of this year in a 59-day operation using 3 US-supplied Thrush aircraft. The aerial operation, code-named "Taung Yan Shin" (Eliminating Dangers

From the Mountain), was launched simultaneously with the sixth phase of the annual Hellflower ground operation which destroyed 3,785 hectares of poppies and brought the total destroyed to 13,608 hectares.¹¹

PAKISTAN

The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) is the primary agency involved in the coordination of narcotics control efforts in Pakistan. Its primary role is to compile intelligence information and forward it to provincial and federal enforcement agencies. By 1983 the PNCB had established 13 field investigation units stationed at strategic points on narcotics trafficking routes. These units are poorly equipped and poorly trained.¹² The opium-growing areas of Pakistan are a unique legacy of British colonial rule. The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where cultivation is centered, retains the autonomy that the British were forced to grant resident Pathan tribesmen in order to keep the peace. Consequently, there are no Pakistani police in the area. The only Government forces present are the Frontier Corps (an auxiliary force of Pakistan's Army with regular Army officers, but locally recruited Pathan troops who are not, strictly speaking, Army personnel), the Khasadars (a semi-official tribal police force), and the Frontier Constabulary (a police force of the Federal Government). Enforcement of Pakistan's narcotics laws in the tribal areas is accomplished through a federally appointed political agent who receives the assistance of the Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary, both coordinated by the PNCB.¹³

Since 1984 officials have clamped down on Pathan tribesmen engaged in opium production. In March 1985, Pakistani soldiers backed by armored vehicles and artillery assaulted the headquarters of heroin kingpin Wali Khan in the Khyber Pass. The attack was the Government's biggest at the time, and coincided with the visit to Pakistan of US Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost. The operation was mounted by 500 members of the Khyber Rifles, an artillery unit, armored personnel carriers, and armored cars.¹⁴ Twenty-four heroin refineries reportedly were destroyed in the Khyber region during 1985, and a December 1985 Pathan revolt inspired a military operation which resulted in the permanent stationing of troops in the area.¹⁵ In March 1986, an armed clash of the combined forces of the Pakistani Police and Frontier Constabulary with opium farmers left eight dead, including a policeman. The clash occurred after several weeks of negotiations during which officials tried to convince farmers to voluntarily destroy their 1986 poppy crop in the Gadoon-Amazai area. Authorities had turned down the farmers' demands for compensation and attempted to destroy the crop. Following the incident, the Government was accused of embezzling US funds intended to repay cultivators, and the incident was represented in the press as an instance of police highhandedness, reflecting a national narcotics policy that was merely cosmetic.¹⁶

In spite of this assessment, Pakistan apparently had one success story in crop substitution. The Buner subdivision of Swat district, once responsible for 30 percent of Pakistan's opium production, was cleaned up by 1981. Buner was a mixed farming area, with wheat and maize on rain-fed land and opium on irrigated land. Developing the wheat and maize crops through better seed and sowing techniques and the use of fertilizer increased yields, provided the incentive for stopping the cultivation of opium, and encouraged the substitution of two new crops, tobacco and sugar cane.¹⁷

Trafficking

THAILAND

Testifying before the US Senate Committee on Appropriations in 1973, writer Al McCoy said that every major narcotics dealer in Thailand had a high-ranking "advisor" in the Thai Police Force.¹⁸ In an article in 1976, McCoy wrote that the Thai police, motivated by low pay and a long tradition of involvement, were willing partners in the drug trade. He noted that the Border Patrol took payoffs for letting opium come across the border from Burma and that the Provincial Police had a system for transporting narcotics from northern Thailand to Bangkok.¹⁹

Rather than grapple with systematic corruption in the Thai police bureaucracy, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has encouraged the establishment of semi-autonomous antinarcotics agencies within the Thai police. The Narcotics Suppression Center in Bangkok has as its operational field force the Special Narcotics Operation (SNO), which is staffed by ordinary officers on special assignment and draws upon the Border Patrol Police and the Provincial Police.²⁰ To mount an antinarcotics operation, DEA, in effect, has to outbid the traffickers for police services. To accomplish this, in exchange for seizures the agency has offered money, free trips to the FBI Academy in Washington, and new military hardware.²¹

During the 1970s, Congressman Lester Wolff, Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, sought to stop US aid to Thailand because of the involvement of Thai officials in trafficking.²² In May 1977, Wolff released the names of 12 ethnic Chinese residing in Thailand who were known to be major traffickers. Some had close connections with the Thai police and Army.²³

Examples of official involvement continue to abound. In July 1974, DEA agents and their Thai counterparts raided a heroin factory on the outskirts of Chiang Mai. Among those arrested was Police Lieutenant Colonel Sawai Pudharak, a deputy provincial police commander, who was managing the lab for a syndicate composed of ranking police colonels. During his trial in 1975, he simply walked away.²⁴ Another proven trafficker at large is Police Lieutenant Colonel Nivars, a former deputy superintendent of Chiang Mai Province, responsible for controlling narcotics. He is believed to be still in the north and protected by police officials.²⁵ Pramuan Vanikkaphun, a police colonel and commander of the Crime Suppression Division of the Thai Police, was prosecuted in April 1973 for supporting and protecting a group of narcotics traffickers. In June 1977, Burmese troops arrested 27 Thai Border Patrol Police and 3 helicopter crewmen at a heroin refinery site in Burma.²⁶

Official collaboration is rumored to have included at one time the very top echelon of Thai leadership. Thai Army Command BK04 was established in northern Thailand in 1970 to oversee the activities of drug trafficking organizations cooperating with the Thai Government as buffers against Communist insurgents. Its first commander was General (later Prime Minister) Kriangsak Chamanan. Kriangsak was specifically responsible for supervising the Chinese Irregular Force (CIF) traffickers, and his personal involvement in

their activities has been hinted at in several ways. A convicted drug dealer, Thavorn Udomleudej, who was later executed, was reported to have named Kriangsak as a trafficker before his death.²⁷ Kriangsak once mediated a dispute between the CIF and the Karens over proprietary rights to jade goods. It was not revealed whether he received any compensation, but he may have been involved. The CIF did build him a house, however, and when Border Patrol Police seized a heroin refinery in Chiang Rai he was suspected of being its owner.²⁸ After coming to power in the 1977 coup, Kriangsak instituted an antinarcotics campaign which immediately apprehended three major traffickers. Of the three, one escaped 2 days after the coup and the other two were summarily executed.²⁹

Some of the roots of Thai military and police corruption can be traced to the close cooperation with traffickers that ensued following the Thai Government's decision to neglect narcotics control in favor of preserving national security interests. The problem is then aggravated by the close relationship enjoyed between the Chinese commercial elite and the Thai political leadership, as well as by the insufficient salaries and funding that is available for law enforcement personnel.³⁰

BURMA

As with the Thais, the official cooperation with trafficking organizations instituted by the Burmese Government for the purpose of countering Communist insurgency has probably encouraged police or military involvement in the trafficking chain. However, unlike activities in Thailand, little has been published on this aspect of drug trafficking in Burma. The Burmese 99th Light Infantry Division at Tang Yan has, nevertheless, come under a great deal of scrutiny, since it is stationed at a major transshipment point for much-prized Kokang and Wa state opium, which, despite the 99th's presence, continues to flow freely.³¹

PAKISTAN

The Pakistani Government's efforts to stop the flow of heroin to the West are hampered by widespread corruption in the law enforcement apparatus, the disproportionate power of the Army in the governing bureaucracy, and official indifference and incompetence. At times it is difficult to determine which is at work. US DEA agents frustrated by the failure of Pakistani police to appear for a prearranged raid do not know whether to assign the policemen's behavior to corruption, incompetence, or indifference.

Suspensions that the law enforcement process is corrupt are supported by instances in which US officials have had to personally intervene with President Zia to obtain convictions and sentencing for traffickers. In one such instance, two major traffickers had been released from jail after being convicted, and were sent back only after Zia was personally informed of the situation. Zia also intervened to force a speedy trial of a deputy superintendent of police in Lahore who was charged with using his influence with the Airport Security Force to allow couriers of heroin to avoid customs searches. The police superintendent, Khalid Tikka, also arrested as a trafficker, headed an anticorruption unit at the time. His case was brought to Zia's attention twice before he was convicted and sentenced.

The Pakistani military is also deeply involved in drug trafficking, although its powerful position in the government and sensitivity to negative publicity has minimized the availability of information. In 1985, seven Army officials were court martialed and awarded sentences ranging from 5 months to 3 years for their participation in trafficking.³² In 1986, two officers, an Army major and an Air Force lieutenant, were arrested in two separate incidents involving the seizure of heroin totaling more than 360 kilograms. Although the seizures were the largest ever made by the Narcotics Control Board, they received little publicity, and only one domestic newspaper referred to the major arrested as an Army officer. The Narcotics Control Board was, reportedly, denied permission to interrogate him, and he is scheduled to be tried in a military rather than a civilian court.³³ The major was rumored to have once been on the staff of a former military governor of the opium growing Northwest Frontier Province. Although unnamed, the former governor is probably Lieutenant General (Retired) Fazal e-Haq, who himself has been linked to trafficking. His successor, Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Hoti, took over as the first civilian governor of NWFP at the beginning of 1986, but left office within 4 months after his son was arrested in the United States on a drug trafficking charge.³⁴

The supposition that "big and influential people are behind the massive heroin trafficking" is a common one in Pakistan and was a subject of debate on the floor of the Parliament in June 1985.³⁵ Pakistani corruption has received a good deal of attention in the foreign press, and the negative publicity has pushed the Government into taking action. Eleven members of the Board of Narcotics Control were arrested in May 1986 on charges including extorting money and drugs from narcotics dealers. All have apparently agreed to give evidence against superiors. At about the same time, Achter Abbassi, one of the top Customs Service officers, was arrested for allegedly moving 1½ tons of hashish to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, and a wealthy businessman named Mushtaq Malik, who shipped heroin for years to Europe and Great Britain, was convicted and sentenced to 3 years.³⁶ Although the impact on corruption may be insignificant, these arrests are an important inroad into the official indifference which has permitted the corruptive process to flourish, and may possibly signal the beginning of a trend.

SECONDARY PRODUCING NATIONS: LAOS, VIETNAM, AND AFGHANISTAN

Unlike the three primary producing nations, Laos, Vietnam, and Afghanistan are producers whose governments have either legitimized opium production to the point where it is an accepted earner of foreign exchange, or where lack of government control has given impetus to opium production. In the cases of Laos and Vietnam, opium planting and heroin trading have apparently become official economic policy. Laos' ruling Communist Party declared in 1985 in a ruling known as Resolution No. 7 that opium was one of the country's most important exports. Thai sources claim that the Laotian Government is increasing the production of opium and heroin to fill the void in the supply of narcotics resulting from Thailand's more effective antidrug measures and that a large portion of the crop is being sent to Hanoi to provide the Vietnamese with additional financial resources.³⁷ Vietnam, however, reportedly is also growing opium to help cover its debts. An agricultural policy document

smuggled out of the country and made public by former Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan discloses that in 1982 the Central Committee authorized the production of opium to raise badly needed foreign currency.³⁸

Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, opium was a traditional Afghan crop, grown only in small quantities. The ensuing war, however, invited international heroin traffickers, taking advantage of the political instability, to turn Afghan farmers into major suppliers of opium which could then be smuggled across the Afghan-Pakistani border by Afghan refugees. Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan are reported to use drugs extensively and, although there is no proof, Western diplomats in the region suspect that Afghan guerrillas are trafficking to support their resistance effort.³⁹

NEIGHBORING NONPRODUCING NATIONS: MALAYSIA AND INDIA

Adjacent to the producing nations of South and Southeast Asia are Malaysia and India, two nonproducing nations which have been absorbed by the drug trade both as markets and as transit areas. Drugs are Malaysia's most serious problem, described by Prime Minister Mahathir as outranking the Communist insurgency in importance. The country has instituted the harshest laws in the region in response. Since 1983, the punishment for possession of as little as 15 grams of heroin has been mandatory hanging.⁴⁰ A 1985 study estimated that Malaysia could have as many as 400,000 addicts and that drug abuse had indeed crept into the armed forces and police, which together reported more than 2,000 cases.⁴¹ The addiction trend among young Malaysian men is said to be alarming, and there is concern that besides urban youth, who make up a majority of addicts nationwide, abuse may be spreading to rural areas, especially to young settlers on newly opened lands.⁴²

Combatting traffickers became the business of the National Security Council in 1983, the same year that legislation made trafficking a capital offense. The Malaysian Police's antinarcotics division has more than 700 detectives, and drugs seized in 1985 include 131 kilograms of heroin.⁴³ A 47-kilometer antismuggling fence of concrete and barbed wire has been constructed along part of the Malaysia-Thailand border to help interrupt the flow from the Golden Triangle.⁴⁴ Although it is never officially admitted, the police have been known to participate in the trafficking network.⁴⁵

Like Malaysia, India, as a close neighbor of a major drug producer, has suffered the consequences through increased trafficking and abuse. Official statistics show an enormous increase in the use of India's ports and airfields to transship heroin manufactured in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Golden Triangle. Until the mid-1980's, India rarely figured into the narcotics imbroglio. Heroin moved more or less directly to the West from Pakistan and Thailand. Tougher enforcement procedures in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand, the revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, all worked to make India look increasingly attractive as a conduit to Western markets and as a market in itself. Bombay, Calcutta, and New Delhi emerged as key cities in the global drug trade while local addiction rates climbed. Heroin addicts in Bombay numbered roughly 80,000 at the beginning of 1986, with several thousand more in other major Indian cities.⁴⁶ Estimates for New Delhi run from 50,000 to 240,000 addicted to heroin, or 4 percent of the city's population.⁴⁷ The addiction problem has been charted on the rise in

northeastern India, as well, where supplies of heroin from the Golden Triangle have been in evidence since 1984.

Until 1985, India's antinarcotics effort was centered on a complex administrative apparatus that begins with the Narcotics Commission under the Ministry of Finance. The Commission coordinates efforts with different agencies including the UN International Narcotics Control Board, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, the police, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the Border Security Forces.⁴⁸ However, following the June 1985 meetings between US and Indian drug officials during Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Washington visit, the Indian Government set up a multi-agency task force in Bombay and Delhi with officials drawn from the CBI, Customs, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, and the local police. A Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB) was also established to collect intelligence and supervise strike action against all kinds of economic offenses, including drug trafficking.⁴⁹

Although there is little information concerning police or military involvement in trafficking in India, there are reasons to believe that it is as extensive as in the other countries discussed. Smuggling in India traditionally has been a profession which police have tolerated in return for pay-offs of one kind or another. Indian smugglers are taking up drug trafficking with alarming speed, and there is no evidence to indicate that traditional relationships with the police have not remained in place.

CONCLUSIONS

It is impossible to discuss narcotics in Asia without reference to the police and military forces. In addition to their role in law enforcement, the corruption of police and military forces plays an important part in any trafficking scheme. Traditionally, these forces have been closely linked with drug trafficking organizations. In Thailand and Burma, the links were at one time official. New developments in the international drug trade that added unprecedented amounts of narcotics to the domestic market, however, force Asian Governments for the first time to take an active role in suppressing narcotics. They are responding not only to international pressure, but to a menace that threatens to destroy their social institutions. A new trend appears to have emerged that is less tolerant of corruption in the police and military, a trend that will not end corruption but may possibly end official indifference.

NOTES

¹Iran is also considered part of the Golden Crescent, but because this study is regionally oriented, areas west of Afghanistan are not considered.

²National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers' Committee, Subcommittee on Production. 1985 Production Estimate, 1985, Photocopy.

³Approximately 10 metric tons of opium are needed to produce one metric ton of heroin.

⁴US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Southeast Asian Drug Trade. 97th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 6.

⁵"Meese Applauds Thai Efforts to Combat Drugs," Bangkok Post, 19 March 1986, p. 3.

⁶John McBeth, "A Heroin King is Dethroned," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol. 115, no. 8, 19 February 1982, pp. 32-34.

⁷"Killing the Curse of the Poppies," Bangkok Post, 19 January 1986, p. 13.

⁸John McBeth, "Drugs: The New Connections," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol. 105, no. 36, 14 September 1979, pp. 37-42.

⁹Daniel Burstein, "The Deadly Politics of Opium," Macleans (Toronto), vol. 95, no. 10, 6 December 1982, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰Jon A. Wiant, "Narcotics in the Golden Triangle," Washington Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 4, Fall 1985, pp. 37, 38.

¹¹"Burma's Anti-Drug War," Muslim (Islamabad), 16 May 1986, p. 3.

¹²Jack W. Murphy, "Implementation of International Narcotics Control: The Struggle Against Opium Cultivation in Pakistan," Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, Winter 1983, p. 228.

¹³Murphy, pp. 216, 217.

¹⁴Stephen R. Wilson, "Pakistani Soldiers Attack Heroin Base in Khyber Pass," Associated Press wire service, 14 March 1985.

¹⁵"24 Heroin Labs Smashed in Khyber Agency," Pakistan Times (Lahore), 6 June 1986, p. 9; "Troops to Stay in Khyber Agency Permanently," Muslim (Islamabad), 6 December 1985, vol. 1.

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¹⁷Terence White, "The Drug-Abuse Epidemic Coursing Through Pakistan," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol. 128, no. 23, 13 June 1985, p. 97.

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